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The ethics of Asian hospitality 
Hospitality in Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism 




The past couple of decades have witnissed an enormous interest in comparative thinking and 
a revivial of interest in Chinese philosophy. Comparative philosophy is aimed at the search 
for identifying similarities and differences between Western and Eastern philosophical 
traditions in order to elaborate on modern sociopolitical problems such as gender inequality, 
ecological civilization and immigration issues. Especially in a time of rapid globalization and 
problems that exceeds national borders, it is nowadays necessary to leave the beaten track 
and explore new streams of thought.  
 
In the case of hospitality studies, it seems more than obvious that we should not only include 
a Western analysis of hospitality, but that we should explore other perspectives as well. We 
should not pursue an understanding of hospitality that can only be understood from a Western 
perspective, but we should extend our understanding to other cultures to get a much fuller and  
more diverse look on the nature and practice of hospitality. This current chapter will try to fill 
the gap by discussing hospitality in the three major Chinese philosophical systems; 
Confucianism, Daoism and (Chinese) Buddhism. As Lashley in Chapter two already notes; 
the requirement to be hospitable has been an important theme of human moral systems across 
the globe. It is therefore not a surprise that the three major Chinese philosophical traditions 
revolve around the question how to be virtuous in a life with others.  
 
Chinese civilization appears to have embodied ideals present in the thought of Confucius, 
Daoism and Buddhism. Although other influences such as the legalist movement, the 
logicians and neo-Confucianism should not be neglected, I will limit the scope of this chapter 
to these early three philosophical systems. I will only concentrate on The Analects 
(Confucius), The Daodejing (Laozi, Daoism), and early Chinese Buddhism, as formed during 
the Medieval Period (4-7th century). The main focus of this chapter will be to answer the 
question how these traditions see hospitality as a virtue and how they treat the stranger. These 
questions will help us to understand the locus and limits of hospitality. The three different 
Chinese traditions will lead to an "Asian ethics of hospitality" in which filial piety and 
closeness to the other are the most important metaphysical assumptions. 
 
To understand the Asian approach to hospitality, it is important to identify on which moral 
assumptions Confucianism, Daoism and Chinese Buddhism are grounded. Important 
questions are if these moral assumptions are based on cultural, social and religious norms that 
might hinder an universal approach to hospitality. It is one thing to be hospitable to one who 
is close to us, but it is another thing to be hospitable to a stranger. A main theme that I will 
raise therefore is if Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism are able to ground the moral 
responsibility to be hospitable to the stranger from outside the Chinese civilization. As Julia 
Kristeva notes in her book Strangers to Ourselves, the ethical challenge of hospitality is to be 
"able to live with the others, to live as others, without ostracism but also without leveling" 
(Kristeva, 1991, p. 2). 
 
The question if the three major Chinese philosophical traditions are able to ground a universal 
approach to hospitality is closely tied to the form of humanism they promote. Humanism is a 
broad category of ethical, metaphysical, epistemological and political philosophies in which 
human interest, values and dignity are being described. Confucianism, Daoism and Chinese 
Buddhism are all grounded in a particular form of humanism, which determines the moral 
compass of their philosophy (McNaughton, 1974; Havens, 2013). 
 
The dominant Chinese conception of humanism is the Confucian theory of Ren (Jen; 人); also 
known as the Mandate of Heaven. This mandate is a self-existent moral law which is nurtured 
by human virtue. For Confucius, man's destiny depends upon his own good words and deeds. 
This leads to a strong emphasis on a virtuous society based on a just government and 
harmonious human relations. In the first part of this chapter I will outline the Confucian 
ethics which I will classify as a classical form of virtue ethics that fosters harmony, filial pity 
and tradition. Although humanism and appropriate conduct towards others are at the heart of 
the Confucian system, I will argue that Confucianism fails to construct a universal ethics of 
hospitality. Due to its moral particularism, it is not able to yield the universal duty to be 
hospitable to the stranger. 
 
The Daoist movement primarily targets Confucian particularism, arguing that it leads to 
viciousness and violence. Daoist philosophy as practised in the Daodejing, emphasizes the 
withdrawal from the world that is characterized by a belief in a false reality of right and 
wrong. Daoism focuses on 'emptying' the mind in such a way that it can act accordingly to 
the unifying source of the world; Dao. The Daoist movement rejects political and moral 
control in favor of an inner-wordly way of thinking. Because Daoism sees Dao as oneness, it 
is very suspicious of language. Daoism argues that languages, and especially the naming of 
things and persons, violates the oneness of Dao and moves human life further away from the 
ultimate truth. Daoism promotes a provisional, relational model of meaning in which 
concepts and terms are interrelated. In paragraph three I will outline Daoist philosophy and 
its language critique. The Daoist critique on language has implications on the way we 
conceive hospitality. When language is artificial and moves us away from the truth; rules and 
regulations that govern the way we need to treat the stranger become undesirable. By relating 
Daoist philosophy to Jacques Derrida's notion of hospitality, I will outline the paradoxical 
nature of "unconditional hospitality" in which both hospitality as its opposite are unified.  
 
The last Chinese tradition I will explore in the light of hospitality is early Chinese Buddhism. 
When Buddhism arrived in China, it was mixed up with popular beliefs and practices such as 
Confucianism and Daoism. The goal of Chinese Buddhism was to gain the wisdom that 
things do not possess a self-nature. More than Daoism, Buddhism rejects languages in favor 
of a bodily experience of the world. I will highlight the importance of the term "ganying" for 
understanding Buddhist hospitality. The virtue of ganying is universalized beyond kinship 
and beyond nationality and as such serves well for unconditional hospitality in which the 
stranger is accepted as stranger. At the end of this chapter I will compare the three traditions 
and will identify filial piety as one of the core characteristics of Chinese culture. 
 
II. Being hospitable to one's relative: Confucianism and ethical particularism 
 
Confucius (551-479 B.C.), the latinized version of K'ung Fu-Tzu, was born a couple of 
centuries before Socrates' teachings on ethics and rhetoric and is one the most influential 
sages of Chinese culture. The primary source of Confucius's teachings are the Lun Yu or The 
Analects, also referred to as "the selected sayings". The Analects have had a tremendous 
impact on Chinese philosophy. David Hinton even argues that: "The Analects have had a 
deeper impact on more people's lives over a longer period of time than any other book in 
human history" (Hinton, 2013, p. 42). 
 
Confucianism is essentially a humanistic philosophy which diverges from views in the 
supernatural to explain phenomena, in favor of reason and rationality (Havens, 2013, p. 40). 
Confucius places Ren, translated as humanity or humankind, in the heart of his philosophy 
and focuses on the practical human life. The perfect man, or the sage, is defined by four 
virtues: ren (humanity), li (ritual propriety), zhi (practical wisdom) and yi  (moral conduct). 
Ren is the most important virtue. The perfect man is to Confucius the "man of ren" who 
"wishes to establish his own character, he also establishes the character of others, and 
wishing to be prominent himself, he also helps others to be prominent" (Analects, 6:28). Ren 
is the virtue of balancing aspects of the self and aspects of society and is expressed by 
conscious acts (chung) of altruism (shu).The virtue Ren is centred around the relations that 
man has with others. McNaughton defines Ren therefore as: "the natural warm human 
feelings for others, graded according to one's relation to them" (McNaughton, 1974, p. 27). 
 
The fundamental concern of Confucianism is learning to be human. Humankind is like an 
uncarved block of wood, who needs moral training in order to be virtuous. The dominant 
theme of Confucian teaching is the equal emphasis on knowledge and action. One need to put 
his virtue into practice in order to be genuinely virtuous, because “A man with clever words 
and an ingratiating appearance is seldom a man of humanity” (Analects, 1:2), but moral 
training through knowledge of rituals and tradition is equally important. Confucianism does 
not focus on a meta-ethical universal theory of humankind, but focuses on the individual who 
realizes his life among others. The Confucian ethics is therefore solidly rooted in society and 
in social relations. Ren can only exist within a social construct and can only be fully 
developed within the sphere of relations around the individual. Ren promotes sympathy and 
reciprocity which are essentially for emotional control and, - ultimately-, for establishing 
social harmony. Filial piety is therefore one of the most important virtues to promote ren. In 
Analects 1:6, Confucius says that “young man should be filial when at home and respectful to 
their elders when away from home. They should be earnest and faithful. They should love all 
extensively and be intimate with men of humanity”.  
To be virtuous is to Confucius tied to Chinese tradition and culture. Respecting one’s 
ancestors and honoring the Zhou dynasty (4000-1000 B.C.) were important aspects of 
cultivating the virtue of li (ritual propriety, rite, role, ritual). In Confucianism, li is aimed at 
humans finding their appropriate place in relation to the tradition and cosmology. In Analects 
1:12 Confucius argues that “Among the functions of propriety (li) the most valuable is that it 
establishes harmony. The excellence of the ways of ancient kings consists of this. It is the 
guiding principle of all things great and small”.  
When the virtue of li is pursued by humans, the virtue of yi becomes apparent. Yi is 
commonly translated as “rightness” or “justice” and involves the moral disposition to do 
good by expressing appropriate conduct towards others. Yi has, - in contrast to the abstract 
notion of li-, a merely practical orientation. Yi represents the accumulated effort of following 
rules and being able to choose the right moral conduct in a given (changing) situation. In 
Analects 17:23, Confucius argues that without the guidance of yi, a man with a favorable 
disposition turns out acting against the Way: “When the superior man has courage but no 
righteousness, he becomes turbulent. When the inferior man has courage but no 
righteousness, he becomes a thief”.  
The last virtue that Confucius distinguishes in the Analects is the virtue of Zhi, which is best 
translated as “practical wisdom”. Practical wisdom is needed in order to correctly judge 
social situations and obey to the rituals and roles that different social relationships prescribe. 
Important to note is that Zhi is not merely an epistemic notion but has a moral connotation as 
well. For Confucius, no part of human life is free from morality. Every aspect of human life 
is participating and appraised by the Way as outlined in the Analects. The virtue of Zhi 
should therefore be interpreted as “the wisdom of having a proper mind”; it is not only having 
knowledge but also acquiring this knowledge in harmony with the Way.  
 
 Confucius’s focus is not on abstract terms and concepts, but evolves around the practical 
human life. It focuses on specific human virtues that endorse the Confucian way. In terms of 
classification, Confucius’s ethics can be classified as a virtue ethics. In line with Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s  (1981) definition of virtue ethics, Confucius’s ethics has a strong emphasis on 
human life as a whole whose character provides the virtues with an particular telos 
(MacIntyre, 1981, p. 204). Furthermore, classical Confucianism seems to match with “ancient 
virtue culture” in which “moral thinking and action is structured according to some version of 
the scheme of the classical” in which “the chief means of moral education is the telling of 
stories. They provided a moral background to contemporary debate” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 
121). In the case of Confucianism, this moral background is the Zhou dynasty and the Book 
of Odes which is used in The Analects as a symbol for this period. The Book of Odes is 
therefore frequently quoted in The Analects to justify Confucius’s moral theory.  
 
Confucius endorses virtues as diligence, reliability and persistence together with cooperation, 
loyalty and responsibility to one's community and organization. The grounding tenet of ren is 
the relationship between two people such as father-son, friend-friend and citizen-king. 
Confucius's main idea is that if these interpersonal relations are well regulated, society as a 
whole will be in good order. Responsibility to the other, - an important ethical precondition 
for hospitality-, is in Confucianism defined in terms of social status and filiality, and as such 
limited to particular individuals. Although Confucius seems to argue that ren should embrace 
all, moral responsibilities seem to be tied to one's specific relation with the other. Confucius 
is very clear in seeing filial piety and brotherly respect as the root of ren (1:2), and underlines 
the importance of moral duties for practical social life.  
 
Filial piety was an integral part of Chinese culture and was therefore embraced by Confucius 
as one of the most important moral duties. We will later on see that even Daoism and Chinese 
Buddhism accommodate in a lesser degree to this cultural background of Chinese 
civilization. The idea that filial piety will harmonize social relation which, as a consequence, 
will lead to a stable society, is the motivation for Confucius's moral particularism. Confucius 
argues that to be virtues is "knowing the right way to act' in different situations. Each 
situation requires different moral acts. Moral particularism argues that there are no moral 
principles and that moral judgments are dependent on the particular situation. Although there 
are some objections to stating that Confucius promotes moral particularism1, it is clear that 
his philosophy is family-centred.  
 
When we try to answer the question if Confucius's philosophy does justice to the stranger, it 
is clear that it immediately runs into trouble. Filial piety and strict obedience to one's 
superiors, jeopardize the responsibility I have to welcome the stranger in an act of 
unconditional hospitality. Yu Hai (2005) argues that xenophobia and the legitimization of 
discrimination against other races in China is largely due to the Confucian tradition. Hai 
argues that: "The Confucian tradition, which has shaped Chinese culture, emphasizes a 
dichotomy between "Hua Xia" (an ancient name for China) and "Man Yi" (neighbouring 
barbarians), saying by way of Confucius "They do not share the same blood as we do, so they 
must be different from us in nature" (Hai, 2005, p. 2). 
 
Confucius's emphasis on filial piety only poses a problem when there is an apparent conflict 
between moral duties. Confucius is very clear in saying that if there is a conflict of duties 
                                                          
1 When one assumes that Confucius embraces a form of moral particularism, it is very difficult to explain its 
tremendous influence on the Eastern world.  
between taking care for our families and helping others, our obligations to our family come 
first. In Analects 3:18, Confucius argues that "In our village there is someone called true 
person; When his father took a sheep on the sly, he reported him to authorities. Confucius 
replied, "Those who are true in my village conduct themselves differently. A father covers for 
his son, and a son covers for a father. And being true lies in this". Here we see in a clear way 
what is especially disturbing in Confucian ethics; its demand for absolute loyalty to one's 
superior leads to choices in particular situations that make the outsider, - the one who has no 
relatives of who he can count-, particularly vulnerable. What Confucius seems to promote is 
conditional hospitality, in which the moral duty to be hospitable depends on the relation I 
have with the other. 
 
Although unconditional hospitality in which every individual has the moral duty to be 
hospitable to every other human being, is closed off by Confucius particularism, it does not 
mean that we do not have the moral obligation to be hospitable. Being hospitable is at the 
core of Confucian ethics, but is hierarchically classified. Confucius does underline the moral 
duty to be hospitable to others when this does not conflict with our moral duties towards 
family or immediate superiors. In Analects 12:2, Confucius argues that "In your public life, 
behave as though you are receiving important visitors; employ the common people as though 
you are overseeing a great sacrifice. Do no impose upon others what you yourself do not 
want, and you will not incur personal or political ill will". If we apply this to the stranger 
from outside the Chincse civilization, Confucius argues that we should not try to force him to 
blend in, or to force him to adopt the same cultural beliefs and practices. Although this is an 
important step in respecting the other as other, it fails to ground the moral duty to be 
hospitable to him.  
 
Confucius's particularism grounds hospitality in some sense, but fails to ground hospitality to 
the one's who most needs it; it fails to protect the refugees, the strangers without citizenship. 
In a world where all human beings must live on the territory of nations, we need to be aware 
that having a nationality is a gateway to other rights. This is especially true in a Confucian 
society, where moral duties are grounded in filial piety and loyalty. Hannah Arendt points to 
the way this system neglects the outsider, the stranger; the stateless who lacks the very "right 
to have rights". The key to the stateless stranger's status is the loss of "his place in a 
community," "his political status", and "the legal personality which makes his actions and 
part of his destiny a consistent whole" (Arendt, 1951, p. 301). 
 
The status of the stranger is in Confucianism unsecure, and is dependent on whether the duty 
to be hospitable to him conflicts with other duties to relatives and society. If hospitality is 
about welcoming the stranger, - the vulnerable other-, in our lives, the Confucian tradition 
seems not to be our best option. We will see that Daoism and Chinese Buddhism both reject 
the Confucian emphasis on the practical life and instead focus on a universal theory of 
(human) life. As such, they go beyond kinship and national identity and are more open to 
accepting the stranger.  
 
III. The innate violence of hospitality: Daoist philosophy and the contamination of 
language 
 
Daoism is named after the central principle of Dao as the origin of the world which pervades 
the tradition of Chinese philosophical writings and rituals. Daoism originated in China, but 
has encompassed over time so many different beliefs, practices and traditions that it is very 
difficult to define exactly what Daoism is. Most scholars argue that Daoism focuses more on 
the nature of Dao and less on how Dao functions than other Chinese schools of thought 
(Wing-Tsit,1963, p. 136; Burik, 2009, p. 90). The use of Dao as the Way, or the Path, is not 
limited to Daoism; all major Chinese traditions use Dao to describe the path that humankind 
should follow. Specific for the texts that are nowadays considered as "Daoist texts" is that 
they see Dao not as a system or as a standard for human conduct, but classify it as the 
spontaneous, eternal and nameless unity of all. Early Daoism saw Confucianism as the main 
problem for all the problems that arose in the late Warring State period. Like Confucius, 
Daoism tries to get back into a state of wu-wei (state of moral perfection). The way to achieve 
this wu-wei state is however fundamentally different than in Confucianism.  
 
Although Daoism does not denote a specific school but rather covers a whole range of 
doctrines; a growing body of literature suggests that the Chung Tzu and the Lao Tzu 
(Daodejing) form the core collections of writings that can be called "daoist" (McNaughton, 
1974, p. 42). In this chapter I will only concentrate on early Daoism and will therefore use the 
Daodejing as primary source. 
 
The fundamental difference between the Daodejing and The Analects is that in the Daodejing 
Dao is not interpreted as method for human moral conduct, but as the ultimate origin of 
being. Dao is interpreted as "oneness"; as eternal, spontaneous, nameless and simplicity. As a 
way of life, dao denotes spontaneity, naturalness, weakness and non-action (wu-wei). Wu-wei 
as the paradox of trying not to try, is the effort of letting nature taking its own course. Wu-
wei, - the action of nonaction-, is the central paradox of Daoism and as a concept is second in 
importance only to the Dao itself which embodies it.  
 
An important aspect of the state of wu-wei is emptying the mind. Edward Slingerland defines 
wu-wei as: "To attain Laozian wu-wei, you need to undo rather than do, gradually unwinding 
your mind and body, shedding book learning and artificial desires. The goal is to relax into a 
state of perfect nondoing (wu-wei) and unselfconsciousness, like settling into a nice warm 
bath" (Slingerland, 2014, p. 99). Daoism is suspicion of language which, to Daoism, makes 
human life artificial. The sage is therefore in Daoism man who "manages affairs without 
action" and "spreads doctrines without words" (Daodejing, 2).  
 
The suspicion of language has to do with the original oneness of Dao which gets lost in the 
process of individuality and naming. For Daoist philosophy, relationality is prior to identity 
and individuality because relationality expresses the nature of Dao as oneness. This 
relationality means that there is no literal meaning of a term; all terms, concepts and notions 
rely on each other and cannot be properly understood independently (Burik, 2009, p. 106). 
 
Language plays an important role in Classical Chinese philosophy. Classical philosophers 
such as Confucius and Mozi, were however less interested than Western philosophers in the 
representative function of language, but were more preoccupied with the pragmatics of 
language. Confucianism was for example interested in language as the ultimate tool to guide 
social behavior and establish social harmony. Tanaka (2004) argues that all references of dao 
need to be understood in terms of language: "Each philosopher's formulation of the 'best' way 
to prescribe our social behaviour has come to be known as dao. A dao is a way to guide our 
behaviour in social contexts. Given that it is language that guides our behaviour, a doa is a 
language, whatever the form it takes, for the guidance" (Tanaka, 2004, p. 194). 
 
Daoist philosophy's approach to understanding dao and language as such is remarkable, 
because the Daoists were interested in the limits of language as guidance. In the Daodejing 
these limits of language are often expressed in the embracement of opposites. Several 
passages draw attention to the unifying structure of opposites in which "to bent is to become 
straight" and "to be empty is to be full" (Daodejing, 22). What the Daodejing wants to show 
is that language's ability to guide us is limited and that we should be aware that all language 
is provisional.  
 
What does this suspicion of language and the exposure of the limits of language means for 
hospitality? Can we be hospitable to anyone if there is no distinct language vocabularium or 
moral guide that can force us to be hospitable? In order to answer these question, it is 
interesting to compare the Daoist's focus on the limits of language with Derrida's postmodern 
project of deconstruction and Derrida's particular view on hospitality. 
 
Drucilla Cornell argues that Derrida's project of deconstruction can best be called the 
"philosophy of the limit" (Cornell, 1992, p.1). Cornell argues that Derrida's intention is not to 
undermine the importance of philosophical practices, but to expose the limits of language and 
as such of any system. The exposure of the limits of language demonstrate "how the very 
establishment of the system implies a beyond to it, precisely by virtue of what it excludes" 
(Cornell, 1991, p. 1). 
 
Derrida has written extensively about language, grammatology and logocentrism. He was 
also politically engaged and wrote on topics such as hospitality. His view on hospitality can 
help to enlighten what the Daoist approach to hospitality would be. In Adieu to Emmanuel 
Levinas (1997), Derrida poses the question if "hospitality is an interruption of the self" 
(Derrida, 1997, p. 51). This deconstructive approach to hospitality is a hospitality in which 
the self is being interrupted by the other. This is only possible if the self and the other are 
ultimately related to each other and do not exclude each other; this is why Derrida argues that 
in hospitality the self imposes the interruption upon itself (Derrida, 1997, p. 51). 
 
For Derrida, absolute hospitality is an "ethics without law and without concepts" (Derrida, 
1997, p. 111). Any law or concept would make hospitality conditional and subject to rules 
and regulations that would undermine its universal structure. Language as such is therefore 
not able to do justice to unconditional hospitality; it enables distinctions, dichotomies and 
rules and as such imposes conditions. Just as in Daoist philosophy, Derrida emphasizes the 
'wholeness' or interrelatedness of terms and concepts.  
 
Unconditional hospitality is structured as a universal singularity which precedes actual 
hospitality or hospitality as enforced by laws and custom. But, as both Daoist philosophy as 
Daoist philosophy remark, this implies an embracing of opposites since both the conditions 
for such hospitality as for its impossibility are unified in this notion of absolute hospitality. 
As chapter 37 of the Daodejing says: "Tao [dao] invariably takes no action, and yet there is 
nothing left undone", unconditional hospitality is indifferent to morality, but forms the 
precondition for our moral duty to be hospitable.  
 
Daoist's suspicion of language affirms a life without a focus on wisdom or knowledge. For 
Daoists, a truth which is derived from linguistic analysis becomes meaningless and serves 
humans little. Instead they focus on man's inner nature and promote an inner-worldly way of 
viewing reality. Although Daoism pays much attention to the inner self of a person, it is not 
meant to exclude the external. Although early Daoism advocates going beyond the given 
structures of the world in the quest for transcendence and salvation, it also tries to 
accommodate to Chinese cultural background by introducing a notion of filial piety. For early 
Daoism, following the dao means also to be at peace with one's ancestors. Mugitani (2004) 
argues that filial piety in Daoism is not concerned merely with the biological parent-child 
relation. Loyalty or obedience would actually obstruct living according to dao because this 
would promote a belief in reality as fixed and stable, something which Daoism rejects.  
 
The Daoist philosophy of hospitality is a "trying not to try" in which we refrain from 
representing, classifying or naming the stranger, and welcome him in a state of wu-wei which 
reveals the ultimate oneness of dao. In the next paragraph, we will see that this notion of 
unconditional hospitality is being taken up by Chinese Buddhism and incorporated in their 
notion of ganying. 
 
IV. Mutual resonance and its demand for hospitality: Hospitality in Medieval Chinese 
Buddhism 
 
When Buddhism first arrived in China via the silk road, it was mixed up with traditional 
beliefs and practices. Due to its resemblance with Daoism, concepts and terms from 
Buddhism were matched by Chinese thinkers and evolved to two different schools of Chinese 
Buddhism:  the school of dhyana (concentration) and the school of prajna (wisdom). These 
schools evolved independently from the evolution of Indian Buddhism. As Liebenthal (1955) 
has argued aptly: "The so-called schools were originated by the Chinese and had no relation 
to Indian controversies. The Chinese asked all the questions and Indian Buddhist revelation 
supplied the answers" (Liebenthal, 1955, p. 74).  
 
The Buddhists regarded the ultimate reality as transcending all being, names and forms, and 
as empty and quiet in nature. Buddhist's goal is to get into the state of wu-wei; which in 
Chinese Buddhism is the unifying experience of nirvana in which one is free from negative 
Karma. Buddhists also express the reality as the unifying truth as dharma. Dharma is the 
ultimate reality which is beyond our complete knowing, but is accessible through the Budda. 
Dharma liberates the enlightened man from Karma and suffering.  
 
The basic belief of Buddhism is the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path. The first noble 
truth is the admission that life is suffering. The second noble truth is that the cause of 
suffering is desire, greed, ignorance and attachment. The third noble truth is to end desire, 
greed, ignorance and attachment. The fourth noble truth tells how to end these vices. In the 
Eightfold plan, Buddhism lays out its soteriological strategy: right understanding, right views, 
richt speech, right effort, right livelihood, right behaviour, right concentration and right 
meditation.  
 
Buddhism started in India as a religion advocating departure from family life, but it ended in 
China praising the virtue of filial piety. In a sense, Buddhism in its original form, was never 
accepted in China; Indian Buddhism was more interpreted to fit Chinese culture than vice 
versa. Buddhism in India embraced the virtue of the celibate life, and it magnified misery and 
suffering inherent in family life. When these ideas were introduced into China, it was 
inevitable that it would be adapted to the Chinese tradition.  
 
Not only did the Chinese thinkers adapted Buddhism in such a way that it was in line with the 
virtue of filial piety. It seems that the Chinse also tried to adapt the problem of causality to fit 
into their own culture. The problem of causality is one of the most important in the Buddhist 
schools. All Buddhist schools think of plurality of causes and effects instead of the one-to-
one relationship between cause and effect. There is ample evidence that the original Indian 
idea of divine power became mingled with the traditional Chinese concepts of "stimulus and 
response" (Ganying). Ganying is treated both as a general condition of life based on 
impersonal causes and more personally as the mutual resonance of individuals and things.  
 
Although the Chinese word ganying does not match any particular Sanskrit term, it frequently 
occurs in Chinese Buddhistst texts. Ganying is seen as the principle which underlies the 
interaction between Buddha and a disciple. The disciple is said to gan (stimulate) the Buddha, 
which resonates the Budda's compassionate ying (response). Ganying does not involve magic 
or supernatural activity per se; it most often refers to the manifestation of an enlightened 
person which is triggered by a group of believers. Ganying involves thus at least two persons 
who are in a state of wu-wei. Ganying can therefore in my opion best be translated as "mutual 
resonance"; it is the resonantal or symbiotic interaction of stimulus and response.  
 
Ganying has received little attention from modern scholars, due in part to its inclusion in 
writings that did not belong to the Indian Buddhist tradition. The concept of Ganying has 
furthermore both scientific as philosophical overtones, and is a compound an binomial 
expression. Gan is semantically related to affect, feeling or stimulus and may syntactically 
function as a verb, a substantive, and adverb or an adjective. The term ying is commonly 
translated as "response", "reflex", or "effect". Ying may also function as a verb, noun, adverb 
or adjective; depending on the relative position of the word within a sentence. Ganying 
subsequently may be translated as "action and reaction", "stimulus and response" or "affect 
and effect".  
 
In Buddhism, ganying refers to a symbiotic response through feelings and affections. It 
unfolds the interrelatedness of all things and exposes their ultimate shared origin. Mutual 
resonance is the presence (being) in which resonates its non-presence (non-being). We saw 
this earlier in Daoism; in this view opposites are dissolved.  
 
In Buddhism, hospitality is intimately related to the divine. The way one treats a guest says a 
lot about one's relation with the divine. Lawrence Babb argues for example that: "the entire 
sequence has one overall purpose: to make the [god or] goddess feel like a welcome guest" 
(Babb, 1975, p. 43). In this sense, mutual resonance is a form of hospitality, and hospitality in 
Buddhism is a form of worship.  
 
Ganying promotes "inductivity", "sympathy", "compassion" and "co-respondance" that result 
from a natural feeling of responsbility which is beyond moral laws and concrete rules or 
regulations. The hospitality that ganying induces, recognizes the universe as "the ongoing 
evolving harmony expressed as the quality of life achieved by the insistent, co-creating 
particulars" (Ames, 2008, p. 42).  
 
Because ganying is in touch with the true nature of the world, it expresses the myriad of 
things and can operate at several levels simultaneously. Secondly, ganying expresses at the 
same time the relationship between the realm of humans and heaven (tian). James Benn 
(2007) describes ganying as a sincere act that justifies one's intentions: "It is understood that 
human actions and emotions can and do cause cosmic response and transformation. Acts that 
are the most sincere because they are selfless will cause the cosmos to respond in accordance 
with the petitioner's intention" (Benn, 2007, p. 7). Hospitality seen in this way is not only a 
mutual resonance between host and guest, but moreover an act of hospitality between host 
and heaven. The hospitality of the host resonates with heaven's unconditional hospitality 
which empowers and justifies the host's act.  
 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper I have outlined the three major Chinese philosophical traditions in the light of 
hospitality. I have tried to outline the foundations of each tradition and explored these 
foundations in relation to hospitality. We have seen that all three traditions are focuses on the 
question how to lead a good life. For Confucianism this life is doing the right thing in a 
particular situation. Recognizing what the right thing to do is to Confucius a matter of 
training and experience. Only the virtuous man who has trained himself extensively 
recognizes what is needed in a particular situation. To Confucius, it is important that we 
change our innate nature through observing rituals and traditions and by having the right 
mindset. An important aspect of Confucianism is appropriate conduct for concrete human 
relation.   
 
When we explore the nature of hospitality in Ancient Chinese philosophy, we need to 
understand the foundations of Chinese culture. The phenomenon of filial piety is, I would 
argue, crucial to our understanding of not only Confucianism, but of Chinese civilization 
throughout time. In september 2015, the Walstreet Journal published an article titled "Why 
China is turning back to Confucius". It showed how China's central party wanted to 
reintroduce the concept of filial piety to estalish harmony within its society. Filial piety 
ground governmental rules and regulations and as such makes it extremely relevant for 
understanding the Asian perspective of hospitality. In the Asian world, it is the family which 
is at the centre; not the individual. The most important philosophical traditions are therefore 
less interested in the moral duty of an individual, but more focused on one's moral duty in the 
light of one's relation to another person. 
 
Filial piety is a virtue of respect for one's father, elders and ancestors. For Confucius, filial 
piety is the foundation and the highest standard for ethical conduct. Filial piety harmonizes 
human relations and as a consequence, leads to a stable and prosperous society. Man's first 
and foremost moral duty is to be hospitable to one's elders, ancestors or father. Hospitality in 
Confucius is first and foremost a conditional hospitality, which is tied by rules and 
regulations. Confucius does recognize the duty to be hospitable to the person from outside 
our community, but this seems to be more the kind of hospitality that implies not doing him 
harm based on the rule that one should not do to another what one does not like himself. 
Based on this rule, we can argue that to Confucius, we should be hospitable to the stranger, 
not because we owe it to him, but because we would want to be accepted when we were the 
stranger. When however this moral duty to be hospitable to the stranger interferes with our 
obligations to our elders, father or ancestors, we should choose for filial piety over helping a 
stranger.  
 
The moral particularism that Confucius seems to promote, is one of the main critiques of the 
Daoist movement. The Daoist contributed all the particular problems that Chinese society 
during the Warring State period suffered of, to the focus on rules, regulations and traditional 
rituals. Daoism pursues the state of wu-wei, a state of being one with Dao. One's moral duty 
should be "trying not to try" and letting go of all linguistic distinctions such as laws, rules and 
regulations. Unlike Confucius, Daoism thinks that less, rather than more culture is needed. 
Confucius's humanism is that of a crude human nature which is in need of cultivation. Man 
becomes virtuous by observing rules such as filial piety and by gaining experience through 
social practice. The Daoist movement argues that cultures has messed people up. To Daoism, 
human nature is essentially good; all we need to do is letting go of everything artificial and 
follow our innate dispositions.  
 
The philosophical target of Daoism is language. Daoism argues that moral predicaments like 
"right"  and "wrong" alienates us from our own nature because it focuses on the external, 
social use of language instead of our inner nature. In the light of hospitality, Daoist seems to 
argue against any form of conditional hospitality that is based on distinctions, rules or 
traditions. What the Daoist movement seems to aim at, is what Derrida has defined as 
"unconditional hospitality". Unconditional hospitality is hospitality as its purest. However, as 
Derrida notes, unconditional hospitality can never be obtained in practical human life. In 
order for unconditional hospitality to be fulfilled, a complete openness would be required, yet 
the very introduction of host and guest would be already a violation of this openness. 
Recognizing the stranger is already conditional and as such already alienates man from his 
innate nature.  
 
What Daoism does contribute to the debate on the nature of hospitality is that conditional 
hospitality is in its nature artificial and cannot really guide us. But, as Derrida indicates, the 
conditional laws are necessary in order for unconditional hospitality to be manifested. We 
need to recognize the stranger for example as stranger in order to be hospitable. What Daoism 
does suggest is that our duty to be hospitable should be universalizing, eternal and without 
constraints; we should be hospitable to everyone, in all times, in all standards. In our daily 
lives however, we can only realize a fraction of this ideal; the ethical dilemma show the 
impossibility and ambiguity of its metaphysical foundation.  
 
A nice parable that illustrates this ethical dilemma is that of Hundan; at the end of the 
Zhuangzi, one of the core Daoist teachings. In the parable, Hundun (Chaos) invites his two 
neighbours, -named  Shu "brief" and  Hu "sudden" -, to visit him. The guests repay Hundun's 
generosity by drilling seven holes (for seeing, hearing, breathing and hearing) in his face to 
make him more "human", but at the end Hundun dies. The parable shows not only that chaos 
as the process that drives existence, cannot be grasped, but it also shows how language can 
lead to a blindness. Shu and Hu cannot see Hundun as Hundun, but see him as "lacking 
something". The problem with Shu and Hu is that they cannot go beyond the linguistic 
categories by which they have learnt to interpret the world. Daoism points to something 
which is very valuable for an ethics of hospitality; it should not be tied by (cultural) linguistic 
distinctions that makes us blind for seeing the other as he is.  
 
Daoism foregrounds the absolute priority of unconditional hospitality but shows us at the 
same time the impossibility of it. Unconditional hospitality is hospitality in its purest form, 
but in its purest form it is also the least attainable, because it embodies both hospitality as its 
opposite. Conditional hospitality is therefore the only act realizable for humans; it is the 
simple fact that if we choose to help a stranger, we exclude by this choice all the others in 
need of our help. Daoism recognizes the paradoxical nature of morality and hospitality and 
argues that language in a sense is not the ultimate method that brings us truth. However, in 
order for man to life his life with others, we need to live at the level where things are 
presumed.  
 
We see the ethical dilemma of unconditional and conditional hospitality back in Chinese 
Buddhism. Chinese Buddhism was influenced by Confucianism and Daoism and adapted to 
Chinese culture. Chinese Buddhism is, like Daoism, fundamentally nondualistic and 
emphasizes the mutual sameness and interpretation of the ultimate and the human practical 
realm. In the light of hospitality, one term that helps us determine the Buddhist approach to 
hospitality is ganying. Ganying as mutual resonance promotes the welcoming of the other, 
the alien, the wanderer and the refugee. It enacts the commitment to take the other not as an 
enemy, but as a friend, setting aside the intimations of hostility in "hospitality". Chinese 
Buddhism embrace in this sense the concept of unconditional hospitality in which the host 
recognizes himself in the other; recognizes the interdependency of everything.  
 
To concude, an Asian ethics of hospitality should recognize one's moral duty to be hospitable 
to one's father, ancestor and family. Filial piety is the heart of the Chinese tradition and 
cannot be taken for granted. Asian hospitality is however not limited to filial piety. Daoism 
and Chinese Buddhism go beyond the ties of kinship and both recognize unconditional 
hospitality as hospitality in its purest form and argue both to be aware of linguistic artificial 
distinctions that are necessary for practical life but leads to moral blindness and narrowness. 
An Asian perspective on hospitality is therefore foremost an ethics of sympathy for 
humankind (ren). humankind who respects family living while at the same time participates 
in nature's wholesome equilibrium and harmony.  
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